Introduction: Making Sense of Violence

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Violence is a slippery concept—nonlinear, productive, destructive, and reproductive. It is mimetic, like imitative magic or homeopathy. “Like produces like,” that much we know. Violence gives birth to itself. So we can rightly speak of chains, spirals, and mirrors of violence—or, as we prefer—a continuum of violence. We all know, as though by rote, that wife beaters and sexual abusers were themselves usually beaten and abused. Repressive political regimes resting on terror/fear/torture are often mimetically reproduced by the same revolutionary militants determined to overthrow them (see Bourgois, Chapter 56; Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 30; and Fanon, Chapter 58). Structural violence—the violence of poverty, hunger, social exclusion and humiliation—inevitably translates into intimate and domestic violence (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33; Bourgois, Chapter 37). Politically motivated torture is amplified by the symbolic violence that trails in its wake, making those who were tortured feel shame for their “weakness” in betraying their comrades under duress. Rape survivors—especially those who were violated with genocidal or sadistic political intent during civil wars (Danner, Chapter 41) often become living-dead people, refusing to speak of the unspeakable, and are often shunned or outcasted by kin and community, and even by comrades and lovers (Das, Chapter 40 and Fanon, Chapter 58).

Violence can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality—force, assault, or the infliction of pain—alone. Violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim. The social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and meaning. Focusing exclusively on the physical aspects of torture/terror/violence misses the point and transforms the project into a clinical, literary, or artistic exercise, which runs the risk of degenerating into a theatre or pornography of violence in which the voyeuristic impulse subverts the larger project of witnessing, critiquing, and writing against violence, injustice, and suffering.

The sadistic Boer cop, Jeffrey Benzien (Krog, Chapter 48), a pathetic minor player in the last stages of apartheid, became a key symbol of apartheid’s inhumanity and cruelty during the South African Truth and Reconciliation amnesty hearings in Cape Town when he demonstrated before television cameras his signature torture technique, the “wet bag” which he used.
to force victims to give up the names of their comrades in the anti-apartheid struggle. Meanwhile, the deep structures of apartheid violence that consigned 80 percent of the African population to rural bantustands and to squalid squatter camps and worker hostel barracks in urban areas – social institutions that resembled concentration camps – were left virtually unexamined by the South African TRC (see Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 60; Sachs, Chapter 59; and Soyinka, Chapter 62). The elderly victim of apartheid who stood before the TRC seeking restitution for the grove of fruit trees uprooted from his yard by security police was treated as a sweet distraction amidst the serious work of the Commission. But the old man spoke to the very heart of apartheid’s darkness and to the more inclusive meanings of state and political violence treated in this volume.

Despite our work in putting together this expansive, eclectic, anthropologically informed anthology, in the end we cannot say that now we “know” exactly what violence is. “It” cannot be readily objectified and quantified so that a “check list” can be drawn up with positive criteria for defining any particular act as violent or not. Of course, police, social workers, and family-court judges must decide whether spanking a child with a hand, a hairbrush, or a leather strap, or throwing a child across a room, or slamming him or her against a wall is a violent act or a culturally defined legitimate expression of parental authority and responsibility. World courts need to decide whether to include “dirty wars” and “ethnic cleansings” under the legalistic rubric of genocide. We have our own political views on these issues and we state these clearly.

Violence itself, however, defies easy categorization. It can be everything and nothing; legitimate or illegitimate; visible or invisible; necessary or useless; senseless and gratuitous or utterly rational and strategic. Revolutionary violence, community-based massacres, and state repression are often painfully graphic and transparent. The everyday violence of infant mortality, slow starvation, disease, despair, and humiliation that destroys socially marginalized humans with even greater frequency are usually invisible or misrecognized (Scheper-Hughes 1992 and Chapter 20). Dom Helder Camara, the “little red archbishop” of Recife, Brazil, railed fearlessly against the military government’s attacks on “violent” landless peasants by reminding those in power of the “violence of hunger” and the “atomic bombs” of sickness and destitution (see Farmer, Chapter 34).

Rather than sui generis, violence is in the eye of the beholder. What constitutes violence is always mediated by an expressed or implicit dichotomy between legitimate/illegitimate, permissible or sanctioned acts, as when the “legitimate” violence of the militarized state is differentiated from the unruly, illicit violence of the mob or of revolutionaries (see Swedenburg, Chapter 53 and Zulaika, Chapter 54). Depending on one’s political-economic position in the world (dis)order, particular acts of violence may be perceived as “depraved” or “glorious,” as when Palestinian suicide bombers and the World Trade Center attackers are alternatively viewed as martyrs or terrorists or when Israeli settlers and the US military forces in the Middle East are alternatively viewed as heroic patriots/liberators or violent oppressors. Violent acts may be denounced as “freakish” (e.g., the cannibalistic serial killer) or ignored as “banal” (e.g., the college date rapist). Violence (like power) corrupts absolutely, except when it is said to “ennoble” or liberate the perpetrator, as when Jean-Paul Sartre (Chapter 27) states that colonized subjects can only regain their humanity through acts of revolutionary violence. Perhaps the most one can say about violence is that like madness, sickness, suffering, or death itself, it is a human condition. Violence is present (as a capability) in each of us, as is its opposite – the rejection of violence.

Our readers will note a conspicuous absence in the organization of our selections. We have rejected the commonsense view of violence as an essential, universal, sociobiological or
psychobiological entity, a residue of our primate and prehistoric evolutionary origins as a species of hunter-killers. Our incisors are, after all, very small. Our nails can inflict pain, but not death. Our minds and our cultural inventiveness, more than our hominid bodies, are our ecological niche. We are social creatures. Cultures, social structures, ideas, and ideologies shape all dimensions of violence, both its expressions and its repressions. Torturing and killing are as cultural as nursing the sick and wounded or burying and mourning the dead. We reject the view that violence is fundamentally a question of hard-wiring, genes or hormones, while certainly accepting that these contribute to human behavior, accelerating, amplifying, or modifying human emotions. But brute force is a misnomer, and it is the very human face of violence that we are trying to unravel here. Sadly, most violence is not “senseless” at all.

Both of us, as editors of this volume, have been involved for many years as active field-workers, teachers, and political advocates in the field of violence. Our collective experiences have shaped the organization of this volume, which we see as a basic reader for conceptualizing violence studies from a multidisciplinary but anthropologically informed perspective.

Bourgois’s focus on violence began through his work in Central America from 1979 through the mid-1980s. His first formal fieldwork site among the Miskitu Amerindians of Nicaragua became the center of a bloody ethnic insurrection that was drawn to the center of Cold War power politics. He had taken a leave of absence from graduate school to work for the Sandinista Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Had he not been expelled by the Sandinista government for coauthoring an article (CIERA 1981: 89–149) advocating regional autonomy for the Miskitu, he may not have finished his doctorate in anthropology. A year later, before beginning his actual doctoral fieldwork on the abusive labor practices of a US multinational banana plantation, he was placed on probation by his graduate program for visiting villages controlled by Salvadoran guerrillas and denouncing US complicity in human rights violations in that country without the approval of his institution’s committee for research with human subjects (Bourgois 1991). Members of his dissertation committee admonished him to choose between “being an anthropologist, a human rights activist, or a journalist.”

Bourgois is best known for his ethnographic work on crack dealers in East Harlem, which addresses the interface between interpersonal “delinquent violence,” including self-destructive substance abuse and the gendered dynamics of brutality in the family and of adolescent gang rape, with the larger structural violence of what he calls US inner-city apartheid. His analysis of the United States allows him to reinterpret the everyday violence he witnessed in revolutionary Central America, especially its gendered contours, which he had not yet explored when he focused instead on the direct, physically assaultive turmoil of political repression, resistance, human rights violations, and organized class struggles and cultural mobilizations.

Scheper-Hughes gradually came to the realization that the family is one of the most violent of social institutions. But the family system – whether it concerned the scape-goating, exploitation, and social death inflicted on the farm-inheriting bachelor sons of County Kerry, Ireland (Scheper-Hughes [1979] 2000) or the hastened deaths of “angel babies” in the Northeast of Brazil (Scheper-Hughes 1993) – was in each instance responding to larger social-political-economic exclusions which made the “violent” behavior seem like the only possible recourse. While studying the “dark interiors” of family life during the mid-1970s in a small mountain community of western Ireland, Scheper-Hughes paid scant attention to the activities of Matty Dowd, from whom she rented a cottage in the mountain hamlet of Ballynalacken. She turned a blind eye to the installation of a small arsenal of guns and explosives in the attic of her rented cottage that Matty and a few of his Sinn Fein buddies were then running to fuel the fires in Northern Ireland. And so, she left unexamined, until recently (see Scheper-Hughes 2000,
epilogue), the links between political violence in Northern Ireland and the family dramas of captive farmers on failed farms that certainly had a violence of their own. Even while conducting fieldwork in Brazil during some of the harshest periods of the military dictatorship (1964–84) Scheper-Hughes did not begin to study state violence until the half-grown sons of her friends and neighbors in the shantytown of Alto do Cruzeiro began to “disappear” – their mutilated bodies turning up later, the handiwork of police-infiltrated local death squads (Scheper-Hughes 2003).

Up until that time Scheper-Hughes believed that the analysis of political violence occurring in the context of military dictatorships and police states, in times of revolutionary transition during and after civil wars and wars of liberation, was best left to journalists. Anthropologists were too slow, too hesitant, too reflective; and the ethnographic knowledge that was produced was too local. Political events were altogether too fast and unstable, so that by the time the anthropologists had something to say it was usually long after the fact. But as Brazilian newspapers insisted on printing stories about the “dangerousness” and the “violence” of shantytown dwellers (especially of poor, young Afro-Brazilians), a public slander that made the work of the death squads seem like a necessary defense against the anarchy of the favela, she came to see that anthropological interventions were absolutely necessary to contest the dangerous half-truths of the media. At that time, she also entered a more frankly activist and political struggle in Northeast Brazil against the hegemony of the death squads, which operated in many cases with the tacit support of the police and political leaders. Later, Scheper-Hughes began to study political violence among the “young lions” during the anti-apartheid struggle and the paradoxes involved in national and personal programs of reconciliation designed primarily to disarm Black South Africans and to help them to “get over” apartheid in face of the frank impossibility of “un-doing” its collective damages. (See Chapters 30 and 60.)

Violence in War and Peace strives, above all, to “trouble” the distinctions between public and private, visible and invisible, legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence in times that can best be described as neither war nor peacetime in so many parts of the world.

Teaching Violence

When violence is addressed in the university curriculum, it is often “safely” cordoned off in military training courses (ROTC), or in the few alternative “Peace and Conflict Studies” programs still surviving at American universities. By and large, however, within the general liberal arts undergraduate curriculum, violence as an object of study makes only cameo appearances. Worse yet, in the natural and behavioral sciences classes (biology, psychology, physical anthropology) where violence is addressed, it tends to be subsumed under biologized notions of “human aggression,” reduced to a discussion of drives and instincts, the XYY genotype, and the fight/flight response. Alternatively, violence is often individualized and pathologized as “deviance” in psychology and sociology classes (as for example in discussions of the criminally insane). When the subject is raised in women’s studies classes, usually violence against women and children, it still often remains trapped in a medicalized/psychologized framework or confined to a totalizing discourse on patriarchy and its aberrations.

These ideological approaches misrecognize the extent to which structural inequalities and power relations are naturalized by our categories and conceptions of what violence really is. They also fail to address the totality and range of violent acts, including those which are part of the normative fabric of social and political life. Structural violence is generally invisible because it is part of the routine grounds of everyday life and transformed into expressions of moral worth. Most importantly in this volume, we want to demonstrate how often the most
violent acts consist of conduct that is socially permitted, encouraged, or enjoined as a moral right or a duty. Most violence is not deviant behavior, not disapproved of, but to the contrary is defined as virtuous action in the service of generally applauded conventional social, economic, and political norms.

For this reason, our anthology is organized around a cluster of readings that constantly juxtapose the routine, ordinary, and normative violence of everyday life ("terror as usual") with sudden eruptions of extraordinary, pathological, excessive, or "gratuitous" violence (genocides, communal violence, ethnic cleansings, state terror, dirty wars, revolutions, guerrilla wars, and vigilante justice). Many selections grapple with the relations and continuities between political and criminal violence, state violence and "communal" violence, and the relations between social inequalities and individual and collective pathologies of power.

A few generative key words and terms inform our anthology and serve as a kind of map through the maze of disparate readings. These include Bourdieu's "symbolic violence" and his related notion of "misrecognition," Taussig's "culture of terror, space of death," and Benjamin's "modern history as a state of siege"; Conrad's "fascination of the abomination"; Arendt's "banality of evil"; Primo Levi's "gray zone," Basaglia's "peace-time crimes"; Scheper-Hughes's "everyday violence" and "invisible genocides," Farmer's "structural violence" and "pathologies of power"; Kleinman's "social suffering," Agamben's "impossibility of witnessing," Foucault's "bio-power"; and, finally, our "violence continuum."

Our selections draw upon the social sciences, moral and political philosophy, psychiatry, literature, and journalism. All the selections are infused with an ethnographic, anthropological sensibility in which scientific observation is combined with moral and political witnessing.

**Tristes Anthropologiques:**

**Anthropology’s Heart of Darkness**

We open this anthology with "Conquest and Colonialism" because of the historic centrality of these processes in shaping contemporary patterns of violence across the world. The treatment of colonial violences opens the door to a critique of the categories of civilization and savagery, progress, underdevelopment, and modernity. As cultural anthropologists we feel that an examination of the colonial and imperialist violence that "produced" the very subjects of our discipline – the so-called primitive, indigenous, traditional, nonindustrialized peoples of the world – is a necessary place to begin. The lives, suffering, and deaths of these "people without history" – as Eric Wolf (1982) described with critical irony those indigenous populations first decimated by Europe and then by the United States – have provided generations of anthropologists with their livelihood.

Genocide and ethnocide constitute anthropology’s primal scene. Despite this history – and the privileged position of the anthropologist-ethnographer as eye-witness to some of these events – the discipline, until quite recently, has been largely mute on the subject. Ethnocide, when treated at all, is divorced from its colonial context.

To this day most early-warning signs concerning genocidal sentiments, gestures, and acts come from political journalists rather than from ethnographers in the field. Most theories of the causes, meanings, and consequences of mass violence and genocide come from other disciplines – history, psychology and psychiatry, theology, comparative law, human rights, and political science. In all, anthropology is a late arrival to the field, and this anthology, published in 2003, represents an opening gambit in an attempt to establish an anthropologically informed field of violence studies.
As Orin Starn (see Chapter 51) notes, violence is not a natural subject for anthropologists. Everything in our disciplinary training predisposes us not to see the blatant and manifest forms of violence that so often ravage the lives of our subjects. The term and modern conception of "genocide" were first coined by Raphael Lemkin (1944) following and in response to the Jewish Holocaust, but genocides and other forms of mass killing have existed prior to modernity and in societies relatively untouched by western "civilization." The characteristic avoidance of violence by most twentieth-century anthropologists was based on a legitimate fear that study and analyses of indigenous forms of human cruelty and mass killing (which certainly exist) would only exacerbate Western stereotypes of primitivity, savagery, and barbarism that took modern anthropology more than half a century to dislodge.

Less charitably, anthropology's theoretical formulations, epistemological orientations, and the bourgeois identity of most of its practitioners steered the discipline away from facing structural violence and the pathologies of power. Instead, the discipline continued its relentless and ahistoric pursuit of the exotic other with literary, philosophical, and descriptive precision, recording the symbol systems, kinship structures, and salvaged remnants in the vacuum of a fictitious ethnographic present.

Meanwhile, those few cultural anthropologists who have dealt directly with violence and cruelty - either arguing from untenable universal premises derived from evolutionary sociology (like Napoleon Chagnon [1968] on the "fierce" Yanomami of Venezuela/Brazil) or from a crude form of cultural materialism (like Harris and Ross [1987] on the "wild-ing" effects of meat protein hunger on male violence toward females, including female infanticide and the collective kidnapping/rape of women across a wide arc of tribal societies) or from an atheoretical, populist ethnographic sensationalism (such as Colin Turnbull [1972] on the cruel to the point of socially pathological Ik people of Uganda) - proved an embarrassing sideshow to the field.²

Like so many inverse bloodhounds on the scent of the good in the societies they studied, traditionally, anthropologists saw, heard, and reported no violence from the field. Violence was not considered a proper subject for the discipline.³ Consequently, the contribution of anthropology to understanding all levels of violence – from individual sexual abuse and homicide to state-sponsored political terrorism and "dirty" wars to genocide is extremely modest.⁴ And those who have deviated from the golden rule of moral relativism are often saddled with accusations of victim-blaming by advocates of a bourgeois politics of representation interacting with new versions of cultural nationalism and cultural fundamentalism.

In his professional memoir, After the Fact, Clifford Geertz (1995) notes somewhat wryly that he always had the uncomfortable feeling of arriving too early or too late to observe the really large and significant political events and the violent upheavals that descended on his respective fieldsites in Morocco and Java. But, in fact, he also writes that he consciously avoided the conflicts, moving back and forth between his respective fieldsites during relative periods of calm, always managing to "miss the violence, the genocide, the revolution" (see Starn, Chapter 51) as it were.

And so there is nothing in Geertz's ethnographic writings hinting at the "killing fields" that were beginning to engulf Indonesia soon after he had departed from the field, a massacre of suspected Communists by Islamic fundamentalists in 1965 that rivaled the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (see Gourevitch, Chapter 15). What Geertz missed was a blood-bath, a political massacre of more than 500,000 Indonesians, carried out with diplomatic support from the US government, following an unsuccessful Marxist-inspired coup in 1965 (though one could interpret Geertz's celebrated analysis of the Balinese cock fight as a coded expression of the fierce aggression that he perceived as lying just beneath the surface of a people whom he
otherwise described as among the most poised, controlled, and decorous in the world). When asked at a presentation he gave at the Russell Sage Foundation in the winter of 1991 why he did not publicly denounce the loss of life and the human rights violations of the families and villagers he studied (especially in light of his own government's complicity), Geertz responded that he had not wanted to distract attention away from the theoretical points he was making by engaging in a media fray or a politics of advocacy.

In other quarters of anthropology a new mood of political and ethical engagement and of "witnessing" (see Part X) resulted in considerable soul-searching, even exemplified toward the end of the life of the Polish aristocrat, anthropology's very own Conrad of colonial anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski. Malinowski began his anthropological career under considerable duress as an "enemy-alien," a Polish-born Austrian citizen detained in Australia while en route to his first fieldwork expedition during the outbreak of the First World War. Granted _libera custodia_ by the Australian government, Malinowski was permitted to conduct his ethnographic research in New Guinea as long as the war continued. This artificially expanded his intended term of fieldwork. His famous field diary, covering the period 1914–18, published posthumously, records the anthropologist's conflicting emotions and identities as a European gentleman, a child of Western imperialism, and a natural scientist trying to reinvent himself and carve out a new science and method for recording and understanding human and cultural difference. Malinowski's own sympathies were initially aligned with the values of his own European civilization, and in a desperate or very likely ironic entry to his Trobriand diary, Malinowski repeats the words of the savage colonizer, Kurtz, from Joseph Conrad's _Heart of Darkness_ (see Conrad, Chapter 1): "My feelings toward the natives are [on the whole] decidedly tending to 'exterminate the brutes' " (Malinowski 1967: 69). Here, the anthropologist, dedicated ethnographer, and racist imperialist become kindred spirits.

When Malinowski finally sat down to reflect on Western imperialism and the moral obligation of his discipline, he wrote that "the duty of the anthropologist is to be a fair and true interpreter of the Native and ... to register that Europeans [have at times] exterminated whole island peoples; that they expropriated most of the patrimony of savage races; that they introduced slavery in a specially cruel and pernicious form" (1945: 3–4, cited by James 1973: 66). Finally, Malinowski sided with the anticolonialist revolutions of mid-twentieth century. He argued passionately against the anthropologist as a neutral and objective observer and "bystander" to the history of colonial violence and the suffering that it visited upon the people and cultures with whom anthropology had cast its lots.

These tentative forays by Malinowski into an engaged and politicized applied anthropology were roundly dismissed by his peers as the irresponsible deviations of an old man past his intellectual prime. Instead, "salvage anthropology" continued to be the acceptable, politically blind, and culturally relative approach taken by twentieth-century anthropologists toward the destruction of indigenous populations. Even Margaret Mead, whose sense of urgency — "We must study them before they disappear!" — was dictated by the accelerating die-outs of indigenous peoples and their languages and cultures.

Hence, we open this anthology with several readings on the violence of Western conquest and on the weak supporting role of anthropologists _vis-à-vis_ Western colonialism. We begin with Joseph Conrad, whose _Heart of Darkness_ has haunted anthropological writings for the past century. There are many anthropological Conrads, from Malinowski to Michael Taussig (see Taussig, Chapter 2) and many dangerous liaisons and brushes in the field between anthropologists and Kurtzian type postcolonials and later-day racists, exemplified in Robert Gordon's critique of the Bushman myth (see Gordon, Chapter 6). So called "applied
anthropology" is especially tainted by history. Born as a stepchild of colonialism (see James 1973; Feuchtwang 1973; Johnson 1982), it came of age during the Cold War (see Nader 1997a; Wakin 1992; Gow 1993; Hymes 1972) only to find itself maturing into a partisan of neoliberal globalization in the name of a kinder, gentler cultural sensitivity and sometimes more openly as cost-effective market-based research.

While genocides predate the spread of Western "civilization," the colonization of Africa, Asia, and the New World incited some of the worst genocides of the eighteenth to late twentieth centuries (the role, for example, of colonialist tropes of biological racism that settled and infected relations between the Tutsi and the Hutu in Central Africa). The modern history of native North America is a particularly egregious case of Taussig's culture of terror/space of death, and we have included here two selections dealing with the anthropological record responding to the die-outs of entire populations of native Californians in massacres and bounty-hunts by Anglo ranchers and gold miners (Kroeber, Chapter 3; Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 4). Tellingly, of the two Kroebers - Alfred and Theodora - it was the anthropological spouse, Theodora, who dealt directly and humanely in her writings with the ongoing history of Northern California Indian genocide so studiously avoided by Alfred, the distinguished father of California Anthropology.

The history of anthropology's intellectual complicity, intended or not, in the erasure of genocide in California's history may seem minor compared to the role that cultural and physical anthropology played in providing a scientific rationale and conceptual "toolkit" for the Jewish Holocaust (see Arnold 2001; Schafft 2001) or to South African apartheid (see Boonzaier and Sharp 1988). But the reification of the "last" Yahi Indian, Ishi, as a living public spectacle in the University of California museum of Anthropology and the preservation of his brain as an object of scientific curiosity - even if mislaid for half a century in a tank of formaldehyde - is on a par with the naked display of Saartjie Baartman, the so called "Hottentot Venus" of South Africa, in circuses in Western Europe and the preservation of her remains until 1976 as a "sexual curiosity" in a Parisian museum, the Musée de l'Homme. These are misrecognized acts of violence that suggest a genocidal impulse - to destroy, to possess, and to display "aboriginal" human remains in the name of science. Again, one is reminded of Conrad's Kurtz and the collection of shrunken heads on poles surrounding his compound in the heart of [colonial] darkness (see Ferguson, Chapter 3). Within the framework of a genocidal continuum, it is essential to recognize the ease with which the abnormal is normalized and the death of "anthropology's" indigenous subjects is accepted as inevitable or routine, even when seen as a scientific or (as in the case of Ishi) a sentimental loss.

One could supply many other instances of the misuse of anthropological ideas and practices in fostering structural, political, and symbolic violence. There are also numerous examples of anthropological ideas and methods used as tools of human liberation in opposition to state projects of mass killing and genocide, such as Maybury-Lewis's Cultural Survival movement, or the structural Marxist tradition of social anthropology that was taught at the Universities of Witswatersrand and Cape Town, South Africa, in defiance of apartheid. Meanwhile, the courageous work of forensic anthropologist, Claude Snow, in collaboration with Mary Clare King, offers yet another example of scientific practice in defense of humanity and human rights in the face of mass killings and genocide (see Sanford 2003). Snow helped to organize and to train the Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense of Buenos Aires, one of the first groups to use the technology of DNA to identify the politically disappeared from the remains exhumed from mass graves.

It is also good to recall that if some anthropological concepts - from Lowie's notion of culture to Ruth Benedict's "configurationalism" to Mead's notions of national character -
were expropriated and applied (as during apartheid) to advance "scientific racism" and genocidal policies, these same concepts have been used at other times and places to foster cultural and human rights. Finally, as this volume illustrates, there were at the turn of the twentieth century a growing number of younger anthropologists who did not "miss the revolution" or turn their scientific gaze away from emerging genocides. They have positioned themselves squarely on the side of the victims and survivors of political and ethnic violence and have designed their research to foster human survival (see Part X, especially Pedelty, Chapter 52; Swedenburg, Chapter 53; and Binford, Chapter 55; and also Nordstrom 1997; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Sluka 1999; Leyton 1998; Mahmood 1996; Hinton 2002).

The Modernity of Genocide — The Holocaust

We devote an entire section of this volume to the Nazi Holocaust because of its deep symbolic resonance, occurring as it did in the heart of the most modern of all European nations and because of the catastrophically tragic, industrialized scale of human death and destruction. We also wanted to acknowledge the massive quantity and the exceptional quality of historical documentation, autobiographical reflection, and critical thinking that this distinctive genre of post-Second World War/Holocaust literature has spawned. This in and of itself poses a quandary, for it is partly through these writings that the Holocaust lives on in history. A few scholars have argued passionately that the best response to the Holocaust would be a purposeful silence, an active obliteration, which is the opposite of merely "forgetting."

The prominence given to this section might seem to imply that the Nazi Holocaust is in some way sui generis and beyond cross-cultural understanding, comparison, or reckoning. But to the contrary, the goal of this anthology is to draw links between forms of violence and terrorism that are normally kept apart and compartmentalized, as well as to make public the other kinds of genocides that are so easily transformed into "public secrets" or normalized into invisibility. Indeed, we want to treat the Holocaust as the outer limit, the extreme pole along a continuum that spans communal violence (Part III), mass killings and disappearances (Hinton, Chapter 18; Taussig, Chapter 19; Green, Chapter 21; Robben, Chapter 23; Danner, Chapter 41; Suarez-Orozco, Chapter 49; Pedelty, Chapter 52) to structural violence (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33; Farmer, Chapter 34; Bourgois, Chapter 37;), including public policies of imprisonment and rape (Wacquant, Chapter 39; Donaldson, Chapter 44) and the violently masculine and deceptively technical language of nuclear weapons researchers (Cohn, Chapter 45).

In this section on the Holocaust we have assembled readings drawn from philosophy (Foucault, Chapter 7; Arendt, Chapter 9), autobiography (Levi, Chapter 8), history (Browning, Chapter 10), and fiction (Borowski, Chapter 11) — including comic strip art (see Spiegelman, Chapter 12). Foucault, with whom we open the discussion, analyzes racialized mass murder as the workings of the ultimate logic of biopower. Governments utilize scientific and moral discourses to manage the biological quality and the "stock" of their citizens, by sanitizing the population to eliminate "polluting" elements — as when the Nazis destroyed millions of Jews, hundreds of thousands of gypsies, disabled people, homosexuals and an assorted melange of communists, Jehovah's Witnesses, nationalists, resistance fighters, and prisoners of war — in the interest of social hygiene and moral order.

Foucault's analysis anticipates Zygmunt Bauman's thesis that industrial-style mass murder is a product of modernist efficiency, engineering, and morality. Certainly, the Nazis disabused an arrogant Eurocentric world of its confidence in progress and the superiority of Western civilization. The industrial scale and systematic logic for Nazi crimes against humanity render self-evident the postmodern critiques of the Enlightenment in all its guises, including the...
humanities and social sciences, especially cultural anthropology. At the same time, however, the urgent need to document all aspects of the Nazi concentration camps, in light of the persistence of Holocaust deniers and revisionists — some of them candidates for high office in Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century — painfully reveals the political dangers, ethical weakness, and historical limits of postmodernism’s embrace of partial truths, multiple and fragmented realities, literary deconstructionism, and moral relativism.

Foucault (Chapter 7), Hannah Arendt (Chapter 9), Christopher Browning (Chapter 10), and Tadeusz Borowski (Chapter 11) all attribute to the Holocaust a mad triumph of rational efficiency, a distorted end-product of the increasing rationalization of late modernity. Eichmann, the SS guard who arranged thousands of deportations and deaths, emerges as an unusually shallow and simple soul, a man concerned primarily with doing a good job, fitting in, not making waves, promoting bureaucratic efficiency, and rising up in the firm, so to speak. Eichmann really cared about being promoted. He was, for Arendt (Chapter 9) a prototype of the “banality of evil” which she took to be the primary characteristic and lesson of the Holocaust. More recently, Agamben (Chapter 57), drawing on Foucault, identified the Nazi concentration camp as the prototype of late modern biopolitics in its creation of a population of “living dead” — known in camp argot as “muselmanner” or muslims – people whose bodies and lives could be taken by the state at will or at whim, neither for (religious) sacrifice nor for crimes committed (capital punishment), but merely because of their “availability” for execution.

In all, the Holocaust is something of a misnomer. What happened in those camps, gas chambers, and ovens had nothing to do with religion or with human sacrifice and burnt offerings to placate angry gods. Rather — if Agamben is correct — the genocide of the Jews was about actualizing the “readiness” of certain vulnerable and targeted populations to be killed, a dangerous theory reminiscent of Arendt’s (Chapter 9) controversial depiction of Jewish leaders collaborating with the Nazis. One thinks of the “muselmann” who had given up hope and the last shreds of their humanity and who existed only as “a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last convulsions” (Agamben, Chapter 57). The Muselmanner bore witness to “the total triumph of power over the human being” (ibid.). Their horrifyingly reduced condition led to their social abandonment by others in the camps.

The Gray Zone

Primo Levi, the Italian Jewish survivor of the IG Farben Petrochemical plant at Auschwitz, developed the concept of the gray zone which bears some family resemblance to Michael Taussig’s space of death. Concentration camp inmates — like those who are disappeared, tortured or starving — are often forced into a morally ambiguous space of mutual betrayal and complicity with the enemy in exchange for the smallest personal advantage. The gray zone is populated by “a thousand sealed off monads” engaged in “a desperate, covert and continuous struggle” to survive (see Levi, Chapter 8).

Levi, an uncompromising moralist, dares to question Holocaust survivors, those like himself who did not die in the camps along with all the others because they were in some sense “privileged prisoners” (Levi 1988: 40). Such a relentless and unforgiving view of the survivor-as-betrayer can be understood as deriving from enormous grief and rage as well as survivor guilt. But Levi had something else in mind. He raises the question of how any one of us might have behaved in the camps. Would you or I have gone along with the ruse, deluding ourselves with the belief that I, at least, will be selected to work rather than to die? What
would I be capable of doing in order to survive? Would I rather die a dehumanized “mummy-man” than make the mortal compromises necessary to stay alive?

Brazilian peasants from that country’s drought and famine plagued Northeast states are, like Levi, aware that the “good” die young and that the ability to survive a natural or a manmade disaster requires “a knack for life” and a willingness to cheat death. The tactics used are not always morally upright ones. They comment of themselves as survivors, “None of us is innocent here.”

While working on this anthology, Bourgois tape-recorded his father, who had always been reluctant to talk about his Second World War experiences. The elder Bourgois was a “civilian” (as Levi called such inmates) who was deported from the South of France to labor at the same IG Farben petrochemical plant as Levi, downwind from the gas chambers and crematoria. Finally, Bourgois senior relented and gave his son the following painfully rendered reflections:

“If there is anything I feel guilty about it’s not knowing what was going on. I think all the time of this young Frenchman from the Jewish camp who worked with us during the day. We weren’t allowed to talk to the Jewish prisoners, but when the guard wasn’t looking, I spoke with him. He was about 22 or 24 years old and we were riding on the back of a flatbed truck. We crouched forward so the guard, a little old German with a big gun wouldn’t hear... [whispering] ‘They are starving us,’ he told me, [lifting his pant leg to reveal his knee]. The joint of his knee was all swollen [pointing to the articulations of his own knee]. You could see the outline of the tibia meeting the base of the knee, visible through the skin.

“He told me that he had been taken from the ‘champ de courses’ to Auschwitz. And it is horrible to say, but I thought that he was a little bit stupid, ‘Why the hell did this guy go to the horse races in the middle of the war in Paris?’ Because when he said ‘champ de courses’ I thought he meant Longchamp where they race horses. I thought that he had been rounded up while exiting the races. But he was trying to tell me that he had been rounded up in the Velodrome de Drancy where they race bicycles. I couldn’t conceive that the French were rounding up the Jews into stadiums for deportation to Germany, let alone for extermination... That was in May of 1944. [pausing] Do you think that man could have survived?

“I too felt a little stupid because I had been picked up coming out of a movie theater in Nice at a routine checkpoint for identity papers. But I had a privileged job and I wasn’t meant to die. I wasn’t Jewish... The chief of my block liked me and used to serve me soup first and he dipped deeply from the bottom of the pot. When one of the others complained he threw his knife into the middle of the table, saying, ‘I’m in command here and the little guy eats first.’

“The other non-Jewish workers used to joke when the smoke from the crematorium blew our way. They’re burning pigs again today’... I didn’t consciously reject anyone telling me that the Jews were being gassed, but when I escaped and told my friends in Paris – even the ones in the Resistance who were feeding me and helping me hide – that the Nazis were starving and working the Jews to death in huge camps, they thought I was exaggerating. When I tried to tell my father, he told me to shut up. He said, ‘Certaines choses ne se dissent pas’ [Certain things are best left unsaid].”

Forced collaboration in the Gray Zone does not always guarantee survival, of course, and very few of the “privileged” prisoners of the Sonderkommando survived. Sonderkommando were the Jews who were charged with responsibility for maintaining and administering the gas chambers. They lived in separate barracks; they ate better and they dressed more warmly than the common concentration camp inmates. We selected a short story by a Communist survivor, Tadeusz Borowski (Chapter 11), on one day in the life of a new Sonderkommando member at the Auschwitz train station. Sonderkommando represent the ultimate collaborators conflating victims and victimizer. Their first task was always to cremate the bodies of their predecessors. Levi sees the gray zone as the final moral challenge, and it recalls the imperative “to defend our souls when a similar test should once more loom before us, even if we only want to understand what takes place in a big, industrial factory” (Levi 1988: 40).
A similar message emerges from Spiegelman’s comic-strip book *Maus*, with which we close this difficult section. Spiegelman, the son of an Auschwitz survivor, opens his book with his father warning him, “Friends? Your Friends? If you lock them together in a room with no food for a week then you could see what it is, friends!” (Spiegelman 1986: 5). The human capacity for infinite petty cruelty is not a particularly original lesson to come out of the Holocaust. Much more important is the implication that the preparation and schooling in “how to behave” during a holocaust or genocide takes place in very normal social contexts and institutions unfolding around us every day.

The Politics of Communal Violence

Bauman’s (1989) thesis linking genocide to a specific level of state formation, technological efficiency, rationality and subjectivity is belied in many of the ethnographic examples included in this anthology. While the legal concept of genocide is new, the “eliminationist” impulse can be found under premodern as well as modern and late modern conditions. A spiritual charter for genocide appears in the Old Testament when God the Creator turns into Conan the Destroyer and unleashes his rage in a flood to destroy the world (save Noah and his family). The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and King Herod’s decree ordering the destruction of all first-born infant sons in Judea are other Biblical allusions to mass killing-as-usual.

Genocides and communal massacres have been attributed to “weak states” (Bayart 1993; Reno 1998) and to statelessness, as in Robert Kaplan’s (1994) controversial “coming of anarchy” thesis to explain the political chaos and violence that has periodically erupted in postcolonial equatorial Africa, such as in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Congo. Conversely, genocides have been linked to strong, authoritarian, and bureaucratically efficient states, like Germany at mid-twentieth century (see Goldhagen 1997; Arendt, Chapter 9). Of course, genocides have also been identified as the products of individualism (Eichmann, for example) as well as its converse, communalism and obedience to authority (Gourevitch, Chapter 15).

Witch-hunts and witch burnings in parts of Africa and highland New Guinea have at times led to die-outs and to demographic collapse verging on genocide (see Knauft 1985; 1987). The impulse to identify and to eliminate all witches, seen as disease objects in some, especially horticultural, societies is motivated by a similar kind of “social hygiene” characteristic of genocide in modern, industrial states (see Douglas 1970). Indeed, mass killing, genocides, and provoked die-outs of scapegoated populations have occurred in pre-state societies, and in ancient as well as modern states.

In Part III on communal violence we are exploring another model of modern genocide – one based on proximity and intimacy (rather than on the bureaucratically impersonal) – in which there is a face-to-face and hand-to-hand mass murder of former neighbors, coworkers, and compatriots. Gourevitch (Chapter 15) sees the Hutu genocide of Rwandan Tutsis as a perverse “exercise in community building.” We “balance,” or rather, supplement this against Liisa Malkki’s (Chapter 14) sympathetic portrait of Hutu refugees who are both former victims and future perpetrators of genocide. The circular chain of violence (cf. Mamdani, Chapter 6) is suggested in the sad, angry narratives of a devastated people “rearming” themselves in a Tanzanian relocation camp for battle as future *genocidaires* against their Tutsi enemies. Malkki presents her Hutu informants as taking heart from a “mythopoetic” history replete with race libels and blood vengeance. Do the ethnographer’s cultural relativism and empathy with escaping Hutu refugees detract from the brewing genocide or do they offer a profound contextualization – or both?
We accept the term "communal violence," but we argue against the Weberian false dichotomy that it suggests between modern, high-tech, hyperrationalized, and impersonal genocides versus premodern, low-tech, intimate, personal, and "charismatic" genocides. Hence, we included in the previous section (Part II) a detailed account by the historian Christopher Browning (Chapter 10) of the activities of the Einsatzzgruppen, an elite group of German soldiers charged at an early stage in the Holocaust with the particularly gory command of marching tens of thousands of Jews into the woods, surrounding their villages, and shooting them at point blank range in the head or neck. It is a description that resembles the Rwandan hand-to-hand, face-to-face approach to genocide. It was only later into the Holocaust that the efficient, bureaucratized - even sanitized - higher-tech model of genocide, using the pesticide Zyclon B in the gas chambers, was implemented to assassinate millions more people, more rapidly, less bloody, and out of the public view. The ultimate bureaucratization of genocide fostered not only the banality of Eichmann the Nazi factotum, but also the "gray zone" of mutual betrayals by victims. It produced a frightening normalization of everyday life in the camps such as Sunday soccer matches between Sonderkommando and SS guards, as recorded in the survivors' accounts of Levi and Borowski, and revisited by Agamben (Chapter 57).

Our selection and juxtaposition of articles also suggests the need to understand community-based killings in their relationship to weak central states and ideologies of racism. Hence, we place side by side an article on the lynching of African Americans in small towns of the rural south in the United States at the turn of the century (Litwack, Chapter 13) with one on the massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda and Hutus in Burundi in the 1980s and 1990s in equatorial Africa (Malkki, Chapter 14 and Gourevitch, Chapter 15). We are mindful, however, of the danger of evoking notions of irrational savagery in a vacuum of state power, postcoloniality, and the global political economy.

What Makes Genocide Possible?

With the shocking reappearance of mass killings in the late twentieth century - in Central Africa (Gourevitch and Malkki in this volume), South Asia (Das 1990; Daniels 1997), Eastern Europe (Olujic 1998), and in Central and South America (Danner, Chapter 41; Green, Chapter 21; Suarez-Orozco, Chapter 49; Pedeltz, Chapter 52; and Robben, Chapter 23) - the world has witnessed the recurrence of what moral philosophers once thought could not happen again, following the Holocaust. The recurrence of atrocities forces us to revisit the question that so vexed a generation of post-Holocaust social theorists: What makes genocide possible? What, after all, can we say about the limits and capacities of human nature? How do we explain the complicity of ordinary people, the proverbial bystanders, during outbreaks of genocidal violence? Adorno and the post-Second World War Frankfurt School suggested that participation in genocidal acts requires a strong childhood conditioning that produces almost mindless obedience to authority figures. More recently Goldhagen (1997) argued to the contrary, that thousands of ordinary Germans participated willingly, even eagerly, in the Holocaust, not out of fear of punishment or retribution by authority figures but because they chose to do so, guided by sociopathological race hatred alone. What conditions made the unthinkable plausible and, worse, doable?

Modern theorists of genocide have proposed certain social-structural, political-economic, and cultural and psychological prerequisites necessary to mass participation in genocides. Indeed, mass killings rarely appear on the scene unbidden. They evolve. There are usually identifiable starting points or instigating circumstances, but they are never as linear, discrete, or predictable as theorists are wont to imply, and these preconditions do not "cause"
genocides to occur. Genocides are often preceded by social upheavals, a radical decline in economic conditions, political disorganization, or precipitous sociocultural changes leading to an undermining of traditional values and widespread anomie, or normlessness. Conflict between competing groups over material resources – land, and water – can sometimes also escalate into mass slaughters when combined with social sentiments that question or denigrate the basic humanity of the opposing group. Extreme forms of “us” versus “them” can result in a social self-identity predicated on a stigmatized, devalued notion of the other as enemy.

The German example has alerted a generation of post-Second World War scholars to the pathologies of social conformity and the repression of dissent. More recently, the conflict in the Middle East, in the former Yugoslavia, and in many postcolonial societies of sub-Saharan Africa, has suggested that a past history of social suffering and woundedness, especially a history of racial victimization, leads to a vulnerability to explosions of retaliatory mass violence. A kind of collective post-traumatic stress disorder may predispose certain “wronged” populations to a hypersensitivity and hypervigilance that can lead to another cycle of slaughtering in “self defense” (cf. Mamdani, Chapter 61).

Ritual sacrifice and the search to identify a generative scapegoat – a social class or ethnic or racial group on which to pin the blame for the social and economic problems that arise – is also a common precondition in the evolution of genocide. Finally, there must be a shared ideology, a blueprint for living, a vision of the world and how to live that defines certain obstacles to the good or holy life in the form of certain kinds of people who must be removed, eliminated, wiped out. There is the belief that everyone will benefit from this social cleansing, even the dead themselves.

Finally, there must be a broad constituency of ordinary citizens who behave as bystanders either (as in the case of white South Africa) “allowing” race-hostile policies to continue without significant civil disobedience or (as in Nazi Germany and in Rwanda) who allow themselves obediently to be recruited in public acts of genocidal violence. Far less well analyzed, is the role of external or global “bystanders” including strong nation-states, and international and nongovernmental agencies, like the United Nations whose delays or refusals to intervene can aid and abet genocides at times when the tide could still be reversed. In the case of Rwanda, for example, UN peace-keepers were explicitly instructed to do nothing. Similarly, during the Holocaust and during the worst phases of apartheid’s program of political terror, a great many US corporations, such as IBM, continued to do business-as-usual with the perpetrators of mass violence, and US Customs barred entry of Jewish refugees, deporting them back to face genocide. The origins and evolution of genocide are complex and multifaceted, but they are not inscrutable or unpredictable even if they are never reducible to our neat categories of political-economic, social-structural, cultural, or psychological preconditions.

Why Do People Kill?

There is something dangerously seductive about this question: the idea that killing can be explained by or linked to a specific set of biopsychological universals. And, indeed, everything from meat protein hunger to unbalanced sex ratios to faulty genes to male hormones to (most recently) the corrosive and explosive effects of social shame (Gilligan 1996) have been invoked in an attempt to answer this question. Such arguments understand pleasure in eating, in sex, in nursing a newborn, in social interaction, and in hunting and killing – as precultural, human attributes.
But to the cultural anthropologist there is no such thing as unmediated natural passions or emotions, for without our cultures we would hardly know how or what to feel. Scheper-Hughes has, for example, described Irish bachelors entering the bridal chambers with fear and trembling. She watched Brazilian shantytown mothers recoiling from offering a breast to a newborn, and she spoke with “dangerous” young lions who fled from ANC military camps in Angola because they could not imagine themselves killing another human being. Killing (like any other powerful human act) has to be learned. But once learned, the resistance to killing (like resistance to sex for those perennial shy Irish bachelors) can be readily overcome – or so the historical and anthropological record suggests.

In his frequently cited book, *On Killing* (which we found useful, but did not include in this anthology), Lt. Col. David Grossman, a former soldier and a professor of psychology at the US Military Academy at West Point, draws on his own battle experience as well as on interviews with veterans of American wars since the Second World War. The real trauma of war, he argues, is not about being killed but about killing, and he records the difficulty most new soldiers face in overcoming a profound disinclination to take the life of another person, even an enemy. But Grossman trades in simplistic biological universals when he posits the existence of a “violence immune system” as a natural human safety mechanism which any military must confront and overcome in training its new soldiers. Grossman argues that by and large human beings are profoundly uninterested in killing and when confronted for the first time with the command to do so often behave like “conscientious objectors” on the battlefield.

Indeed, in her conversations with young anti-apartheid militants in a South African shantytown, Scheper-Hughes was frequently told that killing was unnatural to most young anti-apartheid warriors and that township thugs (“skollies” and “totsies”) had to be recruited into the military wings of the local ANC and PAC branches to perform the violent acts that most of the politicized young men could not bear to undertake themselves. “Do you think that Temba here [pointing to a local ANC political leader] would have the courage to burn a person alive with petrol? Poor as he is, he is not born to do that! He will never do that! But a born skollie has got the courage. He can attack a man in broad daylight. He has the ability to rape and to murder in front of all the people. Yes! He has got that crazy kind of courage. It is in his blood! So, we said, ‘Give him the petrol! Give him the matches! He’ll do the job for us! He will do what we could NEVER do!’” (Scheper-Hughes 1997: 492).

Additionally, a great deal of human fighting among those peoples considered to be exceptionally “prone” to violence often turns out to be staged, dramaturgical, and mock aggression, a kind of “locking horns” that inflicts relatively little damage. In the murderous urban shantytowns of Brazil (where homicide rates are among the highest in the world), when a serious knife fight is about the break out, the aggressors readily allow themselves to be restrained by their relatives and friends. And, as it turns out, up to a third of all reported homicides for urban Brazil are, in fact, the handiwork of the police. Amidst the recent accusations that Napoleon Chagnon’s and Timothy Ash’s ethnographic films of Yanomami aggression and warfare were staged by the anthropologist (see Tierney 2000), no one has raised the more obvious insight that Yanomami forms of warfare are largely dramaturgical events, based on posturing and dramatic displays of fierceness, entailing relatively little bloodshed. Chagnon and Ash’s films are far more useful in demonstrating “sham” aggression than the “sham” anthropology that Tierney would have us see.

Sham killing was also characteristic of the great World Wars of Europe when it was discovered that the majority of new soldiers shot their rifles into the air well above their enemy targets. If David Grossman (1995) is correct, it was only during the Vietnam War that a conscripted
military was effective in applying the principles of behavior modification and operant conditioning – repetition, desensitization tactics, rewards and punishment for hitting human-like decoys and targets such as watermelons painted like heads that explode in a spray of red liquid when hit directly by a bullet. US soldiers were successfully taught to overcome their inhibitions to killing Vietnamese communists and “gooks.”

On the other hand, Stanley Milgram’s classic behavioral experiment on blind obedience to authority (Chapter 16), with which we open Part IV, argues, to the contrary, for the enormous power of authoritative institutions to elicit incredibly cruel behavior from naive subjects, especially when conducted in the name of science. Milgram’s laboratory study was designed in the historical shadow of the Nazi Holocaust to demonstrate how and why normally decent human beings – in this case ordinary Yale University students – could be recruited to commit an atrocity. In this instance, not a single volunteer research participant refused to administer severe electric shocks to counterfeit subjects, when instructed to do so by a scientist in a white coat.

Certainly by the time of the Vietnam War in the mid-twentieth century, American soldiers had learned not only to shoot to kill enemy fighters, but even to obey orders to massacre civilians. These resulted in other transgressive terrorist acts, including gang rape and the mutilation of the bodies of the enemy. Vietnam vets came home laden with war trophies taken from the killing fields, including scalps, gold teeth, and skulls. Girlfriends were sent bullets and bloodied handkerchiefs to wear as necklaces or ankle bracelets. This Bakhtinian “carnivalization” of sadistic death on the battlefield has long vexed anthropologists and other social scientists.

Here, Renato Rosaldo’s (Chapter 17) painfully self-reflexive, almost literary, discussion of Ilongot headhunting is apropos. Rosaldo could not at first understand the blood lust and deep sense of enjoyment over taking a human head expressed by the ordinarily gentle horticultural villagers of the remote tribe in the Philippines. In this classic piece, Rosaldo argues that powerful emotions – especially the anger and grief following loss – are a primary motivating force in human action. This major figure in symbolic anthropology and a pioneer of the reflexive turn in cultural studies, evokes with great sensitivity the cultural logics that inform Ilongot enjoyment in killing their neighbors and preserving their heads. But like his mentor Geertz he neglects to supply the missing colonial historical context. He says almost nothing about the destruction of the Ilongot’s jungle horticultural ecosystem under the guise of national “development” and their persecution under the Marcos dictatorship.

Hinton’s article (Chapter 18) on the Cambodian genocide under Pol Pot draws explicitly from psychological anthropology and emphasizes the role of hierarchy, “face,” and honor. In all, this section highlights the institutional relations and the larger social contexts that have consistently enabled humans to inflict so much systematic brutality on one another across historical epochs and in dramatically distinct cultural contexts.

The State Amok – Dirty Wars

Late modern history is disaster-haunted by world wars, guerrilla wars, civil wars, wars of liberation, and – most pervasively, even if invisibly – by dirty wars in which governments turn in fury against their own citizens suspected of harboring the seeds of subversion – state-terror-as-usual. Part V focuses primarily on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, but also explores links to the US government and military “state terrorism,” especially relevant following 9/11 and the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York.

We open this section with Taussig’s (Chapter 19) “talking terror” piece which harkens back to his essay (Chapter 2) on the cruelty of international rubber barons in the Colombian
Amazon, denounced in Casement's Putumayo report. In the context of a Colombian dirty war, victims and victimizers are conflated and power is exercised through the circulation of terror, but in the 1990s the perpetrator is the modern state itself. The terror operates quietly and secretly, below and between the lines, as it were, and in the blatant contradictions between "the official story" and what actually happens on the ground. The chaos and the terror are disguised behind a façade of normalcy, and the culture of terror moves between the space of death and the space of everyday life. In fact, everyday life is truly terrifying, whether in the form of political kidnappings and torture (as in Argentina [Robben, Chapter 23; Suarez-Orozco, Chapter 49], El Salvador [Bourgois, Chapter 56; Pedalty, Chapter 52] or Guatemala [Green, Chapter 21; Franco, Chapter 22], Colombia [Taussig, Chapter 19]), or in the daily experiences of the shantytown poor of northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 20), who live just one step away from the public morgue and the collective grave and whose only act of subversion is that they have managed to survive at all.

We have brought 9/11 into this section because we see another version of the state amok in the anarchic terrorist attacks. The most powerful military and economic state on earth, the United States, refuses to see, let alone attend to, the human suffering caused by its global economic and political policies (Chomsky, Chapter 25; Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 26).

**Revolutionary Violence**

Violence and political resistance on the cusp of the twenty-first century recall the classic debates of the mid-twentieth century about the necessity and glorious inevitability of violent revolutions to achieve national liberation in the context of anticolonial, socialist struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In Part VI we also explore more recent revolutionary mobilizations in the very different contexts of Northern Ireland and South Africa.

In the 1950s through the early 1980s, anticolonial struggles, inspired by ideals of socialist justice for peasants and workers in the nonindustrialized Third World emerging nations translated into a veritable celebration of armed struggle and revolutionary violence. The most articulate expression of this view was that of the Martiniquan psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon, in writing about his adopted country, Algeria, in *The Wretched of the Earth* (Chapter 58), seconded by Jean-Paul Sartre (Chapter 27).

The public debate between the two leading French public intellectuals of the day – Albert Camus (himself a colonial subject of France born and raised in an illiterate, white settler family in Algeria) and Jean-Paul Sartre (then an active member of the French Communist Party) – over the legitimacy of political violence and terror in the revolutionary struggle in Algeria remains one of the most painful and traumatic philosophical rifts in late modern times. Camus, a Christian humanist, rejected a form of violence that would harm naive bystanders. Forced to choose between a glorious ideal (the anticolonial struggle, which he otherwise supported) and his mother, Camus famously opted for nonviolence in the face of terrorism. "At this moment bombs are being thrown in the trolleys of Algiers and my mother might find herself in one of these trolleys, and if that's your justice, I prefer my mother to justice" (cited in Todd 1997: 379). Sartre (Chapter 27), in contrast, championed Third World revolutionary liberation struggles not merely by any means necessary, but preferably through bloody catharsis.

Inspired by Fanon-the-psychiatrist's extraordinary documentation of the internalization of structural and political violence – especially colonial racism – among Algerians, Sartre amplified Fanon's insistence that only acts of revolutionary violence could possibly emancipate the wretched of the earth, allowing them to become leaders of their own history: "In the
first days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead man, and a free man” (Sartre, Chapter 27, p. 229).

The Algerian revolution and the embrace of anticolonial armed struggle ushered in an optimistic period in which the colonized – and the lumpen proletariat more broadly – were celebrated as the organic vanguard of a new and just global order. From the revolt of Wounded Knee on the Sioux reservation in the northern plains of the United States to the struggles of the IRA in Northern Ireland (Begona, Chapter 29) to the guerrilla revolutions of Nicaragua and El Salvador (Quesada, Chapter 35; Bourgois, Chapter 56) to the mobilization of the Black Panthers in inner-city Oakland in the early 1970s, and, finally, to the student–worker anarchist protests in Paris in May 1968 and in Italy a few months later, the global revolution of the New Left seemed almost at hand.

Hannah Arendt, one of the late twentieth century’s most eminent political theorists, addressed some of the key questions confronting political theory during this period – from the origins of totalitarianism (Stalinism and Fascism) to the rationales for political violence in the colonial world to the ultra-leftist student movements of the late 1960s. Never a very comfortable or politically correct thinker, Arendt was an elitist who was rarely moved by political revolutionary arguments based on the problem of unmet basic human needs. While tolerant of the French student movement and the Vietnam antiwar movement, Arendt was a harsh critic of the American Black Power Movement. Her broadsheet On Violence (see Chapter 28) expressed her response to the student/worker revolutionary struggles of the mid-1960s against the background of the anticolonial revolutions of mid-twentieth century. On Violence was a frontal attack on “The New Left,” and its embrace of the politics of armed struggle. She questioned the conventional view of political violence as the “most flagrant manifestation of power” and she argued instead that violence was the very antithesis and failure of power.

Indeed, almost four decades later, and following broad disillusionment with the failures and betrayals of national liberation revolutionary movements and socialist experiments in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Central America, a hegemony emerged around the desirability of a global economic system based on principles of democracy, human rights, and free markets (see Soros 1999). Meanwhile, violence and terrorism as expressions of political resistance have continued to proliferate from the Palestinian Intifada to the holy wars of Islamic fundamentalists poised against an exploitative world capitalist system and against Western, secular political and cultural dominance.

The righteous political demands of rural guerrilla fighters and urban rebels unified marginalized populations. Initially at least, the mobilization eradicated many everyday forms of violence which were acted out on the interpersonal level often by neighbors and spouses killing each other in drunken rages with machetes. At the end of the wars, however, and when peace was reestablished and overt political violence virtually disappeared, the everyday violence of suicide, and interpersonal and delinquent beatings of loved ones, neighbors, and crime victims often resumed with a vengeance (Quesada, Chapter 35; Bourgois, Chapter 56).

Even during the height of revolutionary struggles, when large numbers of people mobilized in support of national liberation movements, new forms of everyday interpersonal and (especially) gender-based violence reared their ugly heads, sometimes hidden in the rhetoric of liberation (Lancaster 1988; 1992). Some of it took the form of revolutionary or popular justice in which comrades and companheiros killed one another over perceptions and accusations of treachery, complicity with the police state, or even over different interpretations of political strategy (See Begona, Chapter 29; Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 30). Ironically,
revolutionary interpersonal relations are sometimes mimetic of state repression, operating both in response to, and as a reflection of, the logic of the same political repression that the revolutionaries were suffering at the hands of the government which they were trying to overthrow.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, with the spread of a neoliberal social order across the globe, political violence has become passé among intellectuals even if actively practiced by millions of desperately angry people across the globe. Of central concern is a better understanding of the transition from popular political violence in revolutionary situations to the anomic of delinquent violence in the neoliberal social order that has occurred in so many settings. In the case of El Salvador, Bourgois (see Chapter 56) was unprepared for the rapidity and ease of the transition from political violence to criminal and interpersonal violence in the neoliberal context of structural and symbolic violence. Retrospectively this allowed him to discover that the boundary between freedom fighter and coward is often ambiguous and inconsistent in counterinsurgency warfare. Yet again, a “liminal space of death” (Taussig 1987) or “gray zone” (Levi 1988) obfuscates responsibility from those primarily responsible for the terror that constitutes everyday life.

Peacetime Crimes

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34).

Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and *mentalités* of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper-Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license – even the duty – to kill, maim, or soul-murder.

We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and
alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: *Violence in War and in Peace*. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens.

Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted.

In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices—in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth—Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression.

Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” — *crimini di pace*—imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government-engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.”

Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002)?

In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions),
perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonalization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin's view of late modern history as a chronic "state of emergency" (Taussig, Chapter 31).

We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other "total institutions." Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life.

The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to "pseudospeciation" as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremarkable peacetimes that precede the sudden, "seemingly unintelligible" outbreaks of mass violence.

Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Schepher-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of "angel-babies," and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families.

Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by "symbolic violence," the violence that is often "mis-recognized" for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls "terror as usual." All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and "peace-time crimes."

Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places – in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste – the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies "méconnaissance" as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Schepher-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989).

Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-violence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence – and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power – violence, as we are
presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of "controlling processes" (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious.

Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders – and even by victims themselves – as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early "warning signs" (Charney 1991), the "priming" (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the "genocidal continuum" (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable "social parasites" (the nursing home elderly, "welfare queens," undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

Gendered Violence

Because it is difficult to conceive of violence without addressing its almost inevitably gendered contours, a separate category for gendered violence risks obscuring the extent to which gender operates throughout all forms of violence. We developed this separate Part VIII, however, to address a range of gender violences – some obviously visible, cruel, and bloody such as wartime rape (Das, Chapter 40; Danner, Chapter 41) and peacetime rape (Bourgois, Chapter 43; Donaldson, Chapter 44), and others deeply structural and symbolic (Cohn, Chapter 45). In each example, however, the violence is structured to harness cultural notions of femininity, masculinity, procreation, and nurturance and to put them into the service of state wars and mass murder or to fuel peacetime forms of domination that make the subordinate participate in their own socially imposed suffering (Bourdieu, Chapter 42).

Carol Cohn's (Chapter 45) semiotic and ethnographic analysis of how the horrors of nuclear warfare can be normalized through the clean professional languages of science and technology gives new meaning to Benjamin's perception of modernity as a constant state of siege. Our selections on the uses and meanings of rape purposefully span both peacetime and wartime, as well as male and female victims on the battlefield, in prison and in the inner city. Their juxtaposition demonstrates the normalization and institutionalization of this most extreme form of gendered violence.

Whether male or female bodies are being raped, whether individually or collectively, whether in times of conflict or peace, rape is an act of violence against the female or the feminized male body and against the male owners and supposed protectors of those same bodies. The interface of the three bodies – individual, social, political – (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987) is shown to be at stake in the sexual assault on female bodies as war booty (Das, Chapter, 40; Danner, Chapter 41), as expression of adolescent rage (Bourgois, Chapter 43), and as involuted institutional hierarchy. Bourdieu considers gendered oppression to be a classic example of symbolic violence whereby hierarchies are naturalized into a common
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sense discourse shared by the dominated and the dominant. Once again, Bourdieu forces us to recognize the continuum that links the gendered violence of war rape of a deceptively trivial patriarchal aesthetic that makes women want to marry taller men.

Torture and Modernity

The Foucauldian narrative, spelled out most clearly in his *Discipline and Punish*, would have us believe that over the past 200 years torture has been superseded as a legitimate tool of the state. It has allegedly been replaced by more efficient, softer methods for extracting confessions of guilt as well as instilling popular “consent” to the authority of the state by obedient citizens. The black hooded torturer/executioner and the black robed Inquisitioner of the *ancien régime* has given way – or so Foucault suggests – to new social techniques and technicians of governmentality – labor management specialists, urban planners, media technicians, educators, civil servants, and, of course, doctors, counselors, psychiatrists, and social workers. But *pace* Foucault, during the latter half of the twentieth century there was a repugnant modernization and bloody escalation of the official uses of physical and psychological torture (Fanon, Chapter 58) – epitomized in the phenomenon of the disappeared (Suarez-Orozco, Chapter 49; Taussig, Chapter 19).

In the southern cone of South America during the 1970s and 1980s state torture was used in a new way – preventively and as a kind of political inoculation designed to nip threatening, “contaminating,” or subversive ideas in the bud. In Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil, those who were kidnapped, detained, tortured, and killed often had nothing to confess save their innocence and, failing that their own unwillingness to be killed (Weschler 1990). Consequently, forced confessions, suspect since the Enlightenment, once again became “credible” forms of eliciting truth (see *New York Times*, March 3, 2003).

In the late twentieth century, more refined and efficient forms of state torture were invented to wrest absolute and unconditional consent to the state, such as the torture of children in front of their parents and vice versa (Suarez-Orozco, Chapter 49). Torture reemerged as a tolerated political tactic, not only in authoritarian states like South Africa under apartheid, or Argentina during the Dirty War years, but in democratizing states like Brazil in the mid-1980s, and, more subtly, as a public secret in “mature” democracies like the US, in the aftermath of 9/11 or in the use of solitary confinement as a routinized punishment within new “super max” facilities built to contain an ever-expanding number of petty, drug-related offenders in the early twenty-first century (see Rhodes in press; Gilmore in press). Following the Al Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, public debates, unimaginable before “9/11,” have emerged about the possible uses of torture to solicit information from terrorists about future planned attacks in order “to save thousands of lives” (see CBS, 60 Minutes, Sunday, Sept. 21, 2002).

How are we to understand the late modern uses of state-level torture? Torture resides, of course, not only in explicit acts of bodily violence and violation but also in the reversals and interruptions of the expected and the predictable, striking terror in the ontological security of one’s lifeworld. As Elaine Scarry (Chapter 46) has famously described it, torture silences and wrecks language, obliterating words and writing, and thereby *de-scribing* experience. Torture inverts and destroys the given, the commonsense reality, including one’s taken-for-granted experience of embodiment, casting doubt on one’s very existence (“Am I real? Is this really happening to me? Is this a dream?” [see Strejilevich 1997]). Torture produces a profound sort of existential nausea and silence cemented by terror and/or shame for not having remained silent.
Paraphrasing Maurice Blanchot (1995), it is not so much what one undergoes in torture as what goes under with it – i.e., everything that structures human existence: time, space, touch, the senses, and the sentient world. More important, torture obliterates hope and erases the possibility of a future with its long-term traumatic sequel – especially when the shame and guilt of having given up the names of comrades continually assaults survivors of tortures as an ongoing dynamic of symbolic violences. Torture breaks all limits. It is the ultimate spoiler that takes and ruins everything in its path while seeming to leave everything intact.

The apartheid government’s security forces “reinvented” “primitive” witch burnings and they discarded their political enemies by slowly burning them – sometimes while still alive – over barbecue pits fashioned after the traditional Afrikaner family picnic known as the briaii (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 60). The accused “terrorists” (i.e., politicized young Black men) were kidnapped and brought into peaceful forest clearings where they were made to gather sticks and to build the bonfires over which succulent Afrikaner sausages would be roasted and eaten while cold bottles of beer and coca-cola were passed around the fire until the time came for the suspect to be interrogated, tortured, killed, and roasted as well (see Feldman 2002). The Brazilian and Argentinean military’s “parrot’s perch” for breaking backs and for suffocating could be a tool and technique straight out of the Catholic Inquisition. True, the Argentine military did use modern planes to dispose of the dead bodies produced by their medieval tortures, air-dropping them into the ocean.

Meanwhile, the presumably modern invention of political “disappearances” are spoken about by the terrorized populations subject to these roundups for mass slaughter in the premodern idiom of “body snatching,” “blood and organ stealing” (Scheper-Hughes 2001). In Argentina during the Dirty War, for example, widespread rumors of adult- and child-stealing for organs were readily denied by public officials representing INCUCAI, the national system in place for harvesting and distributing human organs from the brain dead. Meanwhile, however, mutilated bodies of the profoundly mentally retarded were later discovered on the grounds of Montes de Oca public mental asylum, also reputed to be a site for the detainment and torture of political prisoners (Scheper-Hughes 2003).

Modern torture is, above all, “smart torture” carefully designed to leave no physical scars, no tell-tale marks on the body. At the trial in 1994 of the township youths charged in the stoning death of American student Amy Biehl at the Cape Town Supreme Court, the three young men singled out as the ring leaders of a spontaneous mob, protested that their signed confessions (the only evidence available to the apartheid state in transition) had been extracted through police torture. The responsible Afrikaner police officer, Mr. Du Plessey, responded to the charge by subjecting the young men to a careful, forensic medical examination to prove (he said) that the many scars and marks on the bodies of the accused were old wounds resulting from domestic rather than police violence and from township brawls and knife fights, untreated skin infections, and badly set broken bones. In short, the public spectacle of those bodies revealed only the ordinary wounds of the everyday and structural violences of township life under apartheid. No politically inflicted “fresh wounds” caused by police interrogation could be identified to support the young men’s defense, according to officer Du Plessey.

An especially sadistic South African security officer known for his theatrical, bipolar swings from “good” to “bad” cop, badgered one of his victims during the South African Truth and Reconciliation hearings: “Don’t you remember the good times we had together? Once, on the road to Vakplas [the brutal police interrogation and torture center] we stopped at the
'Kentucky Fry'shop and you ate more chicken, you said, than you had ever eaten at one time in all your life. We stopped the car and we rough-housed in an open field? Don't you remember that?' The victim conceded that he was half starving and had, indeed, enjoyed the finger-licking good chicken, but not the sadistic game of chicken – a form of torture – that preceded and followed that brief interlude.

Another form of torture as psychological warfare appears in the claims made by police torturers (see Krog, Chapter 48) and other such officially sanctioned sadists to the "sickness exception" (see Parsons 1972). Through the cover offered in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This phenomenon, which evolved out of the "war neuroses," "battle fatigue," and "shell shock" cases of the two World Wars (Young 1995), was enlarged and expanded, following the 1960s, to include other populations exposed to severely traumatizing experiences, from kidnap to rape to police interrogation. Judith Herman (Chapter 47), a radical feminist psychotherapist, is one of the strongest advocates of PTSD being applied in the context of domestic violence and rape, now understood as a gendered form of torture during war and peacetime alike.

But we do have to ask what kind of social and political morality is created by a diagnosis (PTSD) that can fall equally on the victim and the executioner – on Vietnam war criminals (see Young 1995), police torturers (Antjie Krog, Chapter 48) and their victims? Scarry (Chapter 46) via Bourdieu (Chapter 42) reveals another dimension of the disabling and reproductive symbolic violence that emerges from focusing on the torturer rather than the tortured. In the archives of the Supreme Court of Cape Town Scheper-Hughes read through many transcripts in which police interrogators, increasingly on the defense, at the close of the apartheid state, looked for sympathy from a newly conscience-struck court: "We suffered too. Do you think it is easy to stay awake for 24 hours interrogating a terrorist? We skipped meals and went without sleep too." Sergeant Benzien, the man behind the infamous "wet bag" torture technique, defended his lapses in memory, his chaotic emotions, his rage, and his tears as the symptoms of PTSD through the pitifully amateurish testimony of his clinical psychologist, Ria Kotze. Benzien claimed he could not remember exactly what he had done to whom. At various moments during his long hearing before the South African TRC (not covered in Krog's brief report) Benzien presented himself as just another victim of apartheid. To the outside observer Benzien remains an unreconstituted political monster, but to Justice Albie Sachs (Chapter 59) there is room in the New South Africa even for the likes of Sergeant Benzien.

Perhaps the real contribution of medicalized approaches to the traumatic residues of torture and abuse is that they recognize links between perpetrator and victim. Torturer and tortured participate in the other’s world, not only in terms of bad faith and false consciousness, but also when Sergeant Benzien identifies with Tony Yengeni, as his double, his Conradian secret sharer. Perhaps one of the great insights of the post-Holocaust twentieth century is that we can no longer assume an absolute incommensurability between victims and perpetrators. We have finally entered the gray zone.

Ethnographic Witnessing

Section X on “Witnessing/Writing Violence” is posed as a basic challenge to twenty-first-century modern anthropology. Only one nonanthropologist – a comic-strip writer – is featured in this section, which is meant to be an unabashed clarion for frank political engagement in situations of genocide and chronic structural violence. Contrary to Taussig’s view that writing against violence might be impossible (or actually backfire), we are willing to strike a
compromise, recognizing the weakness and limitations of ethnography but suggesting a more human role of engaged witness over that of scientific spectator. This requires a certain wariness of the ways that naive fieldworkers can fall prey to delusions of political activist grandeur or to becoming pornographers of violence. Here we are thinking of Clifford Geertz’s insightful critique of the privilege of first-world ethnographic authority (as “I-witnessing”) and, by analogy, of the images of the AIDS sufferer that Benetton used on billboards to advertise their line of clothing. There is always the intellectual trap of ethnographic realist writing posing as political activism per se.

Anthropologists who make their living observing and recording the misery of the world have a special obligation to reflect critically on the impact of the brutal images of human suffering that they foist on the public. As medical anthropologists our terrain is the suffering body. The texts and images we present to the world are often profoundly disturbing. When we report and write in an intimate way about scenes of violence, genocide, and extreme social suffering, our readers have the right to react with anger and to ask just what we are after (after all)? Indeed, what do we want from our audience? To shock? To evoke pity? To create new forms of totalizing narrative through an “aesthetic” of misery? What of the people whose suffering is being made into a public spectacle for the sake of the theoretical argument?

Our years of observing many different forms of misery, violence, and chronic social suffering has shown us that the more frequent and ubiquitous the images of sickness, suffering, and death, the more likely they are to become invisible. Shock reactions to blood and violence are readily extinguished. People everywhere have an enormous capacity to absorb the hideous and go on with life and business as usual. As Taussig (Chapter 19) notes, humans have an uncanny ability to hold terror and misery at arm’s length, even when it occurs very close to home.

Those for whom the representation of hunger, misery, and violence is central to their life’s work, need to continually resensitize their audiences as well as themselves to the state of emergency in which we live. To do so we must locate the proper distance from our subjects. Not so distant so as to objectify their suffering, and not so close that we turn the sufferer into an object of pity, contempt, or public spectacle. We need to avoid the aestheticization of misery as much as a descent into political rhetoric and polemics.

In a rural squatter camp in South Africa Scheper-Hughes was invited to record (and to photograph) the wounded bodies of three young thieves who had been flogged almost to their deaths (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 30). When she tried to back away, her field assistant, Sidney Khamalo countered: “You must do it for evidence.” And this record was, in fact, used at several open-air meetings in the Chris Hani squatter camp during an acrimonious debate on the role and place of popular justice, discipline, and punishment in the context of the new democratic South Africa. After defying the codes of rough justice that obtained in the camp, Scheper-Hughes brought one of the flogged thieves to a nearby hospital for treatment. Death threats ensued and she was, ultimately, brought to a camp meeting where she was asked to justify her actions, probably the most terrifying moment in an anthropological career marked by a certain degree of political contentiousness.

Anthropological witnessing obviously positions the anthropologist inside human events as a responsive, reflexive, and morally or politically committed being, a person who can be counted on to “take sides” when necessary and to eschew the privileges of neutrality. This stance flies directly in the face of academic non-engagement. The gift of the ethnographer remains, however, some combination of thick description, eye-witnessing, and radical juxtaposition based on cross-cultural insight. But the rules of our living-in and living-with peoples in dramatic flux, often on the verge of extermination, remain as yet unwritten, perhaps even
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unspoken. There is no appropriate distance to take from our subjects during torture, lynching, or rape. What kinds of participant-observation, what sort of eye-witnessing, are adequate to scenes of genocide and its aftermath, or even to structural violence and ethnocide? When the anthropologist is witness to crimes against humanity mere scientific empathy is not sufficient. At what point does the anthropologist as eye witness become a bystander or even a co-conspirator?

These remain vexing and unresolved issues. But the original mandate of anthropology and ethnography remains clear: to put ourselves and our discipline squarely on the side of humanity, world-saving, and world-repair, even though we may not always be certain about exactly what this means or what is being asked of us at any particular moment. In the final analysis we can only hope that our time-honored methods of empathic and engaged witnessing, of “being with” and “being there” – as tired as these old concepts may seem – will provide us with the tools necessary for anthropology to emerge as a small practice of human liberation.

Aftermaths: Getting Over

This leads quite naturally into our final Part, “Aftermaths,” which corrects the celebratory impulse and contradicts banal assertions of personal and political closure and reconciliation. Instead, these readings open a Pandora’s box of ongoing conflict in states poised between war and peace. South Africa’s much-heralded political transition offers a classic case in point. In the first decade of the new South Africa the political violence of the anti-apartheid struggle metamorphosed into criminal and delinquent violence arising in the economically marginalized shantytowns that are the legacy of apartheid. Talk of reconciliation and of restorative justice side-track the legitimate demand for redistributive justice, a call that strikes terror into the hearts and minds of those who still believe in the trickle-down effects of global capitalism. Similarly, in El Salvador, criminal violence killed more people than wartime violence during the 10 years following the peace accords and the end of the civil war in 1991.

Many wounded nations and populations – from post-military-dictatorship Chile to post-apartheid South Africa to post-genocide Rwanda and Guatemala – have put their faith in international tribunals or in independent truth commissions to deal with the ghosts of the past. At times this has meant uncovering mass graves and reburying the unquiet dead. At other times – as in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – this has meant a complicated political gamble in which justice is traded for truth. But the very idea that individuals and nations can heal and ultimately recover from violence falls prey to inappropriate and impoverished medical and psychological metaphors. The history of human violence teaches us that there are few happy endings. The only answer to violence resides in the struggle to maintain a constant state of hypervigilance and a steadfast refusal to turn into the very same enemy and genocidaire that one most fears and hates.

NOTES

1 In testimony presented to a United Nations Forum organized by the World Council of Churches, Bourgois had to remove at the insistence of his anthropology graduate program his photographic evidence of massacred civilians, lest he violate an interpretation of anthropological ethics mandating the unconditional anonymity of research subjects/collaborators (United Nations Economic and Social Council 1982; see also Bourgois 1991).

2 See, for example, the controversy surrounding Darkness in El Dorado by Patrick Tierney (Tierney 2000; American Anthropological Association 2002).
3 For a notable exception to this rule see the edited volume *Sanctions for Evil* edited by Nevitt Sanford and Craig Comstak, 1971, a project organized in response to the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and to which a few anthropologists contributed.

4 This point, made by Elliott Leyton at the plenary session of the Canadian Anthropological Society in 1997, belies the substantial contributions he has made to ethnographies of violence – from the structural violence of mining (Leyton 1975) to the pathological hatred that drives serial murderers (*Hunting Heads*) to collective responses to African genocide (Leyton 1998).

5 On August 9, 2002, the remains of Ms. Baartmann, who was sold in 1810, and paraded in England and France in local freakshows, were buried with honor in Hankey, South Africa, following a long struggle by South Africa’s “colored” community over her repatriation.

6 The late canon law scholar, David Daube, who had himself escaped Nazi Germany and later helped several of his relatives to escape the camps as well, once told Scheper-Hughes that in answer to a naive question from a young grandchild about who this man Hitler was, and whether he was a good man or bad, he responded: “It doesn’t matter.” When questioned about the logic of this response David replied that it pleased him enormously that the memory of the Holocaust was dying in the younger generation so that they could be free of the terrible burden of the memory.

REFERENCES


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